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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the exporting behaviour of Russian manufacturers by considering the 
effects of firm characteristics and external conditions. Two measures of export behaviour are 
considered: the decision to export and the share of exports to developed markets. I find that 
specific exporting experience is the main determinant of both export status and destination. 
Contrary to studies for other countries, firm features, with the exception of firm size, are 
irrelevant for export status, while labour productivity is important in determining the intensity 
of exports to developed markets. There is also evidence that spillover effects from 
agglomeration have an effect on exporting. At the same time, a lower degree of regulatory 
capture and a less corrupt judiciary matter for orientation towards more developed markets, 
while regional resource dependence does not hinder manufacturing exporting.   
  
 
 
 
 
JEL classification: D21, F14, L60, O50, P23, P28, P31, P33, P37, R12. 
Keywords: export decision, export destination, institutions, regulatory capture, spillovers, 
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Introduction 
 
Russia’s remarkable growth rates in recent years are widely believed to be heavily reliant on exports of 
natural resources. Yet, excessive dependence on the extractive sector can damage long term growth 
prospects, since its counterparts often are feeble development of manufacturing and scarce industrial 
exports. In this vein Isham et al. (2005) highlight the long term hazards connected with an export structure 
that is too concentrated on resource extraction. Their analysis of growth performance in 90 developing 
economies, between 1957 and 1997, reveals that countries whose export structure is dominated by “point 
source” exports –oil and minerals - are much more exposed to risks of slowdowns.  
 
In the case of Russia, the share of natural resources in total exports has been steadily rising in recent years. 
For instance, OECD (2004) reports that, between 1997 and 2003, the share of oil has risen from 23% to 40% 
of the total, while, in the same period, the computed increase in revealed comparative advantage (RCA) for 
oil has exceeded 15%.1 Much of the policy debate on Russia’s future, thus, concerns the need for the 
Russian economy, including the composition of its exports, to diversify and become less reliant upon 
extractive industries. 
 
This paper contributes to the debate by examining the decision to export, regardless of destination, and the 
share of exports to developed countries of Russian manufacturers. It is important to take into account the 
destination of shipments because exports to the CIS, a much more homogeneous market with respect to 
Russia itself, cannot be considered on the same level as exports to third, notably developed, countries. In 
fact, developed markets are more challenging both for the lack of commercial ties inherited from the past 
and for the higher quality and cost competitiveness demanded of Russian exporters. 
 
Export decision and destination are examined by looking at factors that have been found to be significant in 
studies for other countries, namely firm characteristics and exporting experience. Attention is also devoted 
to elements that may be relevant in the specific case of Russia. The first such element is the possibility of 
spillovers from neighbouring exporters, which may be important since the spatial distribution of industry 
continues to be heavily shaped by decisions made by Soviet central planners, and exporters may tend to 
survive in less artificial industries and locations. The second element is the role that may be played by 
structural regional features, notably, the quality of the institutional environment, the consequences of 
resource dependence and the degree of business sector development.   
 
Analysis will proceed in two steps. The first step will examine the role of firm characteristics, specific 
exporting experience and agglomeration effects on the decision to export in the period 1996-2001 and on the 
share of exports to developed countries in the period 1998-2001. Firm level data from the Goskomstat 
Russian Enterprise Register Longitudinal Database (RERLD) are matched with the Russian Customs Export 
database for the construction of export related variables. Variables representing agglomeration of 
manufacturing exporting are obtained from the matched database: regional-industrial export propensity is 
defined as the share of exporters in a region and sector, while regional–industrial export intensity is defined 
as the share of exports by value in regional-industrial output. 
 
The second step will examine the role of institutional factors and other regional conditions, taking 2001 as a 
reference year. Institutional variables include the Slinko et al. (2005) index of regulatory capture and the 
Transparency International regional corruption index. Controls for other regional conditions are taken from 
the Yearbook of Russian regions and include an index of natural resource dependence, constructed as the 
share of extractive industries in Gross Regional Industrial Production, and the share of small enterprises per 
capita. 
 
Results indicate that specific exporting experience and firm size are the main determinants of the decision to 
export, while labour productivity is important only for the intensity of exports to developed markets. 
Spillover effects deriving from the agglomeration of exporting activity also seem to matter, especially for 
                                                 
1Revealed comparative advantage (RCA) is an empirical indicator of trade specialization. Defining Xi and Mi as, respectively, 
exports and imports, RCA is computed, for each sector i, as: 
100⋅



−= ∑∑ kikii MMXXRCA
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export destination. Among structural features, unfriendly regulation and a corrupt judiciary are found to be 
particularly harmful for firms that export a larger share of their production outside the CIS. Regional 
resource dependence per se, on the other hand, is inconsequential for manufacturing exporting, thus failing 
to provide evidence to diagnose “Dutch disease”. A lesson to be drawn may be that resource dependence is 
harmful only insofar as it contributes to degenerate the quality of existing institutions.  
 
This study is organized as follows. Initially, is a brief review of the literature treating the firm-level and 
environmental determinants of export behaviour. Next, hypotheses concerning the determinants of export 
performance are proposed. Following a description of available data, the next section investigates the 
consequences of firm-specific features, agglomeration effects and environmental conditions on two aspects 
of exporting performance: the decision to export and the share of exports to developed markets. A final 
section proposes some concluding comments.  
 
 
1.  Literature 
 
1.1 Firm-level determinants of exporting and spillovers from neighbouring exporters  
 
A primary determinant of a firm’s decision to export is its productivity, which is connected with its ability to 
compete in international markets. The literature linking engagement in foreign markets and firm level 
productivity originated as empirical. Testable hypotheses were then formalized in theoretical models that 
aim to explain why certain firms successfully enter export markets and why they are more productive than 
their domestically orientated counterparts. The process by which some firms in a given population self-
select into export markets is usually embedded in models of industry dynamics with sunk costs of entry, 
where heterogeneous firms are subject to random shocks to their productivity. Only certain firms are able to 
withstand these shocks and therefore enter or remain in the exporting sector, others exit. 
 
Most of the empirical evidence indicates that exporters perform better than non exporters in terms of a wide 
range of indicators, such as productivity, size, wages paid, length of survival. In order to elucidate the 
positive correlation between exporting status and performance, the literature proposes two main 
explanations. One is the self-selection hypothesis, whereby firms which are engaged in foreign markets are 
more productive prior to exporting, and, therefore, self-select into export markets. If entry entails sunk 
costs, only more efficient firms will find it profitable to enter the export market in the first place. The 
learning-by-exporting hypothesis, on the other hand, maintains that exporting has a positive impact on firm 
performance, therefore exporting firms become more productive subsequent to their decision to enter 
international markets. Efficiency enhancements result from knowledge and expertise acquired as a direct 
consequence of exposure to competition in foreign markets. A number of empirical studies have been 
conducted for both developed and developing economies, and they are predominantly favourable to the self-
selection hypothesis.  
 
In the context of developed countries, Bernard and Jensen (1999), using manufacturing data for the United 
States, find robust evidence in favour of the self-selection hypothesis.2 Bernard and Jensen (1999a) find that 
exporting is associated with a reallocation of inputs from less efficient to more efficient plants. The 
aggregation of plant level results indicates that this reallocation effect brings a significant contribution to 
total factor productivity growth in the manufacturing sector. Melitz (2003), while finding a rationale for a 
causal link between productivity and exporting, also proposes a theoretical argument for the relationship 
between openness, reallocation effects and aggregate productivity. A general equilibrium model is 
constructed incorporating heterogeneous productivity across firms. Entry into the export market is costly. As 
a consequence, firms with higher ex ante productivity self-select into the export market, while those with 
lower productivity are only active in the domestic market. Falling trade costs induce firm-level reallocations, 
through the expansion of more productive firms and the contraction or exit of their least productive 
counterparts. This process leads to an increase in aggregate productivity. 
 
                                                 
2
 Other studies on developed economies include Girma et al. (2003) for the United Kingdom and Greenaway et al. (2003) for 
Sweden. 
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As for the learning-by-exporting hypothesis, evidence in its favour is less compelling. Clerides et al. (1998) 
analyse manufacturing data for Colombia, Mexico and Morocco and find that a firm’s exporting history has 
no significant impact on current production costs. This paper includes a theoretical model of a firm’s 
decision to diversify in the export market. The entry decision is based on comparison between expected 
future profits, which depend on current and future productivity, and the sunk cost of entry. Learning-by-
exporting is contemplated by having current productivity depend on prior export experience. Simulation 
results indicate that firms that enter or remain in the export market have higher productivity than firms that 
stop exporting or remain only in the domestic market. These findings imply that firms self-select into the 
export market, based on current productivity. Learning-by-exporting has the sole effect of widening the gap 
between exporting and non-exporting firms. 
 
Kraay (1999) finds strong support for the learning-by-exporting hypothesis in a panel of Chinese 
enterprises. A possible explanation for this result is that he models experience differently than other authors: 
rather than export propensity, created as a dummy for export status in any given year, Kraay examines 
export intensity, constructed as share of exports over total sales. This suggests that positive learning effects 
on productivity may indeed be present when taking into account past export shares in firm turnover rather 
than past export status per se.    
 
Aw et al. (2000), using firm level manufacturing data from the Republic of Korea and Taiwan (China), 
analyse the link between a producer’s total factor productivity and the export decision. The focus is on the 
relationship between productivity and movements in or out of export markets. Interestingly, only in Taiwan 
entry and exit from export markets reflects systematic variations in productivity, while in Korea exporting 
experience plays an important role. 
 
Spillovers from the exporting activity of firms operating in the same industry and region have also been 
considered in the literature as possible determinants of export orientation. Such location-specific spillovers 
could derive from the fact that geographical concentration of exporters may make it feasible to construct 
specialized transportation infrastructure or may improve access to information on the preferences of foreign 
customers. 
 
Aitken et al. (1997) explicitly contemplate this possibility in the case of Mexican manufacturing and 
conclude that the only spillovers having an impact on a firm's exporting decision are those from 
multinational enterprises and not from general exporting activity. Clerides et al. (1998) and Bernard and 
Jensen (2004) also find weak support for regional and sectoral spillovers in the case of, respectively, 
Colombian and U.S. firms. Aw et al. (2000), find that vertical spillovers from subcontractors lower the sunk 
costs of entry into the export market in Taiwan, as opposed to Korea. Such spillovers may be a substitute for 
firm-specific export experience in determining international orientation. Barrios et al. (2003), examining a 
panel of Spanish firms, find that own R&D activity, a gauge of a better firm, is an important determinant of 
export activity. At the same time they also find a stronger marginal effect of intra-sectoral R&D spillovers 
on export intensity for firms that export to OECD countries, than for those that export to less developed 
countries. 
 
 
1.2 The role of the environment 
 
Structural features of the environment in which firms operate are likely to influence their behaviour and can, 
therefore, be interpreted as determinants of their propensity to export as well as of the destination of their 
shipments. 
 
The first such element is the quality of surrounding institutions, which conditions the behaviour and the 
incentives of economic agents, including the international orientation of firms. In general, the risk of 
expropriation deriving from an arbitrary rule of law and weak protection of property rights is likely to 
diminish incentives for investment and innovation, which are prime sources of productivity enhancements 
and of the ability to compete in export markets. Poor institutional quality also implies other collateral 
effects. For instance, external finance, both equity and debt, will not be easily obtained because of the 
difficulty to enforce the underlying contracts. For the same reason, foreign investors will be cautious to 
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become engaged, thus leading to inferior knowledge of foreign markets and  reduced access to a broader 
array of financial opportunities to fund investment and innovation.3 
 
Acemoglu (2006) offers a general framework to analyze the emergence and persistence of inefficient 
institutions. He highlights the role of elites, defined as groups with the power to choose policies that allow 
them to extract rents from the rest of society. The consequence of this rent-seeking on the part of elites is the 
diversion of resources from productive activities and the distortion of incentives for both allocative and, 
thorough the discouragement of innovation, dynamic efficiency, with negative repercussions on long-run 
growth. 
  
This approach generalizes and formalizes the idea of institutional subversion or state capture, whereby law 
making and enforcement institutions are subverted by special interests, who shape the content of laws, 
regulations and court decisions for their own benefit.4 Institutional subversion may occur if some agents are 
endowed with lobbying power, perhaps deriving from the availability of large financial resources or an 
otherwise privileged status. Powerful groups may compete for political influence in order to influence the 
content of policies, as in the models described by Becker (1983) and by Grossman and Helpman (1994), or 
may attempt to subvert the judicial system, as in Glaeser et al. (2003), where the efficiency of the judiciary 
is inversely proportional to the degree of asymmetry in the power of the parties involved. 
 
Referring to forms of interaction between firms and the state, World Bank (2000) and Hellman et al. (2003) 
make a distinction between “influence” and “capture”. Influence is intrinsic to features of firms, such as 
their status of state-owned enterprise, state monopoly or to the fact that they operate in politically sensitive 
industries or regions. Capture, on the other hand, is a rational survival strategy on the part of successful new 
firms, who have bidding power vis-à-vis politicians and bureaucrats to effectively purchase the content of 
laws and regulations or their enforcement. The strategic goal of influencing or capturing the law making and 
enforcement process is to prevent the emergence of competition, while a more tactical goal would be to 
ensure that incumbents can fully benefit from the rents deriving from their position, for instance by 
receiving favourable tax treatment or subsidies from the budget. 
 
The abundance of natural resources may exacerbate these institutional pathologies, as emphasized in several 
recent studies, which have established a connection between natural resource abundance, the quality of the 
institutional environment and long-run growth. The proposed mechanism implies that rents generated by 
natural resources lead to rapacious rent-seeking, which diverts resources from productive activities and, as a 
consequence, hampers long run economic performance.5 
 
Resource dependence may also affect economic performance as in Dutch disease strand of theories, whereby 
the extractive sector causes factors of production to be drained away from manufacturing, thus impairing its 
potential productivity and ultimately ensuring the decline of the sector as a whole. Since manufacturing 
entails positive productivity spillovers, this has harmful repercussions on growth.6 Furthermore, the 
volatility of resource prices on international markets, and the consequent fluctuations in the relative prices of 
resources and other exports, will also increase uncertainty in the domestic non-resource sector. Resource 
dependence also frequently entails real exchange rate appreciation, thus increasing competitive pressures on 
domestic exporters in other sectors, and affecting their ability to export. At the same time, the high value of 
the domestic currency will increase the purchasing power of domestic consumers in terms of foreign goods, 
thus further increasing the pressure on domestic manufacturers through the channel of import competition. 
 
 
                                                 
3
 This is the case in Russia, where international capital is mostly present in production for the domestic market and in fuel sectors. 
See Yudaeva et al. (2003). 
4
 The shaping of institutions by special interests is known as state capture or institutional subversion and is an extension of the 
narrower notion of regulatory capture, whereby regulations are devised for the benefit of the regulated as a consequence of 
asymmetric information or collective action problems. The concept of regulatory capture was introduced in the seminal works by 
Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976). A comprehensive treatment is provided by Laffont and Tirole (1993). 
5
 See Baland and Francois (2000), Leite and Weidmann (1999), Torvik (2002) for a theoretical framework. Isham et al. (2003), 
Mehlum et al (2002) and Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) perform cross-country empirical studies.  
6
 Seminal models of Dutch Disease are proposed by Bruno and Sachs (1982) and Sachs and Warner (1995). 
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2. Hypotheses 
 
In this section I state a number of predictions regarding the determinants of export decision and destination, 
which relate the general considerations of the previous section to the Russian case. A first set of hypotheses 
refers to the effects of specific exporting experience, firm characteristics and spillover effects. A second set 
considers structural features of the Russian environment, notably the quality of law making and enforcement 
institutions, the consequences of resource dependence and the degree of business sector development. 
 
 
2.1. Experience, firm characteristics and agglomeration effects 
 
 
Specific exporting experience influences the export decision and the destination of shipments. 
 
The preliminary hypothesis to be verified is that in Russia, as in other economies for which studies have 
been conducted, specific exporting experience, in the form of sunk costs of entry and past export volumes, 
leads to persistence in exporting activity. Experience should be relevant in Russia since Russian firms are 
bound to have a significant presence in markets of the former Soviet space, as a legacy of commercial ties 
from the old order. Additionally, the CIS can be considered a fairly homogeneous economic space, thus 
further contributing to facilitating the penetration of Russian exporters, who can be expected to have a 
competitive advantage in those markets descending from their knowledge of local preferences and demand 
conditions. 
 
Experience may, for opposite reasons, also be relevant for exports to developed countries, since sunk costs 
of entry and past export volumes may be crucial factors to be able to penetrate and maintain a foothold in 
less familiar markets, characterized by more intense competitive pressures and more demanding customers. 
 
 
Firm characteristics influence the export decision and the destination of shipments. 
 
An additional hypothesis to be tested is that in Russia, as in other countries, firm characteristics are an 
important determinant of export behaviour. In particular, larger and more productive firms should be more 
inclined to be present in international markets. Furthermore, better firms should be capable of exporting to 
developed, hence more competitive, markets. As emphasized in the previous hypothesis, export destination 
is likely to be particularly relevant for Russia: I expect exports to other CIS countries to be easier than 
exports to third, notably developed, countries, where firm characteristics, such as productivity, could be 
essential in markets that are more challenging in terms of quality and cost competitiveness of products. 
 
 
The spatial distribution of industry inherited from Soviet central planning is likely to highlight the spillover 
effects of agglomeration. This may produce a significant influence on the export decision and the destination 
of shipments. 
 
Local agglomeration effects are explicitly treated in World Bank (2004). It is reported that Russian industry 
is less locally concentrated than US industry and that agglomeration has been on the rise since 1992. Low 
initial agglomeration is interpreted as the effect of a strategic design by Soviet central planners, who 
intentionally distributed standard-sized production facilities across the vast space of the USSR, generating a 
distribution of industry, which, as outlined by Gaddy and Hill (2003), is likely to differ from the pattern that 
would have prevailed under market conditions. 
 
Given the vast expanses of the Russian territory, as well as the distorted and dispersed location of 
production units, the consequences for Russian producers in terms of proximity to factors of production, 
subcontractors and destination markets might be relevant. In particular, more viable firms are likely to 
survive in locations and industries which were less artificially located to begin with. This implies that 
internationally competitive firms, especially if they are present in developed markets, are more likely to 
emerge in agglomerated regional and industrial clusters. 
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2.2. Institutional quality and other regional conditions 
 
 
Better institutional conditions, namely lower institutional subversion or state capture, favour the emergence 
of internationally competitive manufacturers. 
 
The main regional characteristic on which I focus my attention is institutional quality, notably capture or 
subversion of law making and enforcement by powerful firms. Institutional subversion is the consequence of 
the lobbying activity by powerful business interests, which has the effect of undermining a level playing 
field for all economic agents, since influential players attempt to receive privileged legislative treatment, 
access to scarce budgetary allocations, as well as favourable court rulings in commercial disputes with other 
firms. There is some evidence that this is the case in the Russian enterprise sector. For instance, Slinko et al. 
(2005) find tax breaks to be the most common form of preferential treatment received by influential firms, 
followed by subsidized loans from the budget and direct subsidies. Frye (2002), based on survey evidence of 
Russian firms, finds that court decisions are perceived as being easily manipulated by the state and, even 
more, by powerful businesses. 
 
World Bank (2000) and Hellman et al. (2003) point out how firms operating in “high capture” 
environments, defined by the existence of a highly pervasive “market for capture”, are forced to make 
considerable efforts to survive unfriendly regulation and a biased judiciary. Indeed, capture may even be a 
strategic option, especially for successful firms. The choice of capturing law making and enforcement 
institutions is, nonetheless, costly and may, notably, influence the variable cost of production and hence the 
expected profitability of exporting.7 
 
Some empirical studies examine the wider implications of state capture. These include a series of works 
based on the two rounds of the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) 
conducted in 22 transition countries 8 and Slinko et al. (2005), who analyse the Russian case. These studies 
find that capture is associated with both substantial benefits for captor firms, and negative externalities for 
the wider economy, notably for other firms. For instance, Slinko et al. (2005) discover that capture impairs 
the performance of non-influential players, while negatively affecting small business growth, tax capacity of 
the state, and share of social public expenditure.  
 
Admittedly, regional conditions other than the quality of the institutional environment may have an impact 
on the emergence of internationally competitive manufacturers. In order to take this possibility into account, 
two control hypotheses regarding regional conditions will also be considered: they address regional 
heterogeneity in resource dependence and in business sector development. 
 
 
Resource dependence may hamper the emergence of internationally competitive manufacturers. 
 
Natural resource rents may contribute to exacerbate state capture by offering both the financial means and 
the incentives for political pressure.9 As a more general implication of resource abundance, symptoms of the 
related phenomenon of Dutch disease may be found in the lack of international competitiveness of the 
manufacturing sector. Manufacturers not only face the long term constraints imposed by the drainage of 
physical, financial and human capital towards the resource sector, but also have to overcome the more 
transitory difficulties imposed by the volatility and frequent real appreciation of the exchange rate. 
 
Melitz (2003) provides a lens for contemplating a counter-hypothesis to the negative effects of resource 
dependence. He notes how increased competitive pressure from international trade stimulates intra-industry 
reallocation of market shares and factors of production. Exchange rate appreciation, which may be ignited 
by reliance on resource exports, inevitably intensifies competitive pressure on both export and domestic 
                                                 
7
 Appendix C proposes a model of the export decision in which structural features of the environment directly contribute to  the 
variable cost of production. The expenses that have to be incurred to capture laws, regulations and court decisions are an example of 
how the institutional environment can weigh upon firms’ costs. 
8
 Studies based on the BEEPS survey include Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann (2003); Hellman, Jones, Kaufmann and Schankerman 
(2000); Hellman and Schankerman (2000); Hellman and Kaufmann (2003). 
9
 See De Rosa (2006). 
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markets. Such an outcome may be interpreted as an increase in effective exposure to trade, notwithstanding 
the trade policies actually implemented and the intentions of policymakers. The result of such a process may 
not be the thwarting of manufacturing in its entirety, but, rather, the acceleration of the weeding out of less 
competitive firms, via the reallocation of market shares and profits to more efficient players. In the context 
of exporting, this might be apparent in the effective ranking of firms in the three categories of exporters to 
developed markets –the best firms-, exporters to the CIS, and non-exporters. Ahrend et al. (2006) compare 
Russian and Ukrainian industrial sectors, using Ukraine as a baseline counterfactual, and find evidence that 
higher wage levels in Russia have been accompanied by higher levels of labour productivity. This suggest 
that resource wealth may have forced Russia’s manufacturing sector to be more productive in value creation 
and that the reallocation effects implied by Melitz (2003) may have been at work.10  Indirect evidence in the 
same direction is also provided by Bessonova et al. (2003), who find a positive impact of import 
competition on the productivity of domestic firms.  
 
 
Regional heterogeneity in business sector development may influence the emergence of internationally 
competitive manufacturers. 
 
The effects of the diverse paths of reform followed by Russian regions may be evident in the heterogeneous 
development of the enterprise sector. A thriving small business sector reflects the vitality of the region in 
which a firm operates, for instance by fostering the emergence of linkages between exporters and regional 
suppliers, which may reduce firms’ costs, thus ameliorating their international competitiveness. As pointed 
out by Aw et al. (2000) in the case of Taiwan, such vertical spillovers from subcontractors lower the sunk 
costs of entry into the export market acting as a substitute for firm-specific export experience. 
 
A large small enterprise sector may also have a negative interpretation. Models of Dutch disease highlight 
the abnormal expansion of the non-traded sector - notably services, retail trade and construction – as a side-
effect of resource dependence. This may contribute to the plight of manufacturing by accentuating resource 
drainage.11 If this were the case, a large presence of small enterprises would not be a gauge of advanced 
regional development but of an employment of factors of production which is not functional to 
manufacturing activity.  
 
 
3. Data12 
 
The main firm-level dataset used in the analysis is the Goskomstat Russian Enterprise Register Longitudinal 
Database (RERLD).13 This was matched with the Russian Customs Export database for the construction of 
the export-related variables. The focus of this study is manufacturing export. Since it is fairly common 
practice for Russian firms to engage in the exporting of natural resources, regardless of their field of activity, 
care was taken in excluding non-manufacturing transactions from the export database before matching it 
with the RERLD.14 The RERLD was also enriched with a foreign ownership dummy obtained by matching 
the RERLD with the Register of Foreign-Owned Firms (RFOF). 
  
                                                 
10
 The domestic factor market is identified by Melitz (2003) as an important channel for the weeding out of less productive firms 
from export markets. In particular, the increased demand for labour caused by the expansion of more productive firms bids up the 
real wage, thus forcing their less productive counterparts, who cannot afford higher costs, to exit. Action by policymakers aimed at 
interfering with the flexibility of factor markets would hinder this beneficial reallocation process and, thus, prevent the economy 
from reaping the full benefits of increased aggregate productivity accruing from exposure to trade. 
11Such an outcome would be caused by the windfall revenues from exports of natural resources being poured into non-traded 
activities.  See Bruno and Sachs (1982) and Sachs and Warner (1995). 
12
 See Appendix A for further details. 
13
 The Goskomstat RERLD is likely to offer a poor representation of the new enterprise sector since newly created firms may have 
weak incentives to report to Goskomstat. Furthermore, since the census excludes, by design, all the firms that are more than 75% 
individually owned, it will omit a very large share of start-ups. Appendix B proposes a methodology for obtaining the definition of 
new firms employed in the remainder of this study. 
14
 I would like to thank Konstantin Kozlov of CEFIR, Moscow for this insight, as well as for his irreplaceable assistance in cleaning 
and matching the two databases. The metallurgy sector includes both firms that are active in the extraction of raw materials and 
firms that are engaged in their processing. The transactions concerning the former were excluded from the database. 
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A general impression regarding the continuity of exporting activity can be obtained from Table 1 and it 
indicates that less than 20 % of Russian manufacturers had some involvement with exporting and that only 
approximately three percent were continuously present in foreign markets in the six years of the window of 
time available. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
A glance at Table 2 confirms that the basic characteristics of exporters in Russia, relative to non-exporters, 
are largely in line with what is observed in most countries. Exporters appear to be much larger, in terms of 
employment, more productive, more capital intensive and with a larger foreign presence. Continuous 
exporters are significantly larger, but not more productive, than both intermittent exporters and non-
exporters. 
  
[Table 2 here] 
 
A dataset from the Customs of the Russian Federation contains details regarding the export transactions 
effected by Russian firms. A matching exercise with the Goskomstat census allows to link transactions to 
various destinations with the characteristics of the enterprises that performed them15. The last column of 
Table 2 shows that exporters to developed markets are the most productive and pay higher wages, while 
they are not more capital intensive and are not larger than other exporters. It is also noteworthy that a higher 
proportion of these firms than the average for exporters stems from the new private sector and is owned by 
foreign investors. 
 
Table 3 confirms that, while the great majority of transactions to all destinations can be attributed to 
traditional enterprises, new firms seem to perform a larger share of transactions to more, rather than less, 
developed markets. Less than 20% of transactions to the CIS are effected by new firms, emphasizing the 
importance of established trade links with traditional markets. The share of new firms’ transactions rises 
substantially to 28% when considering developed markets as a whole, and to over 30% for the EU15, the US 
and Canada.  
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
Table 4 reports the breakdown of export destinations to different regions. The largest share of transactions is 
directed to developed countries, and the portion pertaining to the CIS slightly declines between 1998 and 
2001. This might be interpreted as evidence of some redirection of trade towards more developed markets 
due to the more favourable exchange rate conditions as the Rouble was devaluated in 1998. This effect 
appears to be fading out after 1999, possibly due to the fact that the exchange rate effect was rapidly eroded 
as the Rouble began to re-appreciate in real terms after 1999.16 Furthermore, most Russian firms were able 
to exploit previously untapped domestic demand by expanding their market share in the domestic market, as 
imported intermediate and final goods became more expensive for domestic customers.  
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
Table 5 reports the evolution of agglomeration of manufacturing exporting across Russian regions. Two 
measures are considered. The first is export propensity, defined as the share of exporting firms present in the 
region and operating in a given industrial sector. The second is export intensity, constructed as the share of 
exports by value in regional-industrial output. 
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
                                                 
15
 Data on the destination of transaction cover the period 1998-2001. For the sake of comparability of export destination with general 
exporting activity, Tables 2, 3 and 4 present averages for 1998-2001. 
16
 Author’s calculations, based on the International Financial Statistics database, indicate that at the end of the sample period, in 
2001, the Rouble’s real exchange rate had recovered 86% of its 1996 value, after bottoming out at 66% of the reference value in 
1999. This provides evidence of rapid and sustained real exchange rate appreciation in the aftermath of the crisis. 
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The pattern for export propensity indicates that, while the share of exporting firms is declining, exporters are 
becoming more agglomerated in regional-industrial clusters, as indicated by the diminishing value of the 
standard deviation. At the same time, the evolution of export intensity indicates that, at least until 2000, the 
proportion of sales by value of regional industrial clusters that is exported shows a marked increase, with its 
dispersion across region-sectors also increasing.  
 
Since each firm is identified according to its region of operation, it is also possible to associate each firm to 
regional characteristics. The regional variables considered include the Slinko et al. (2005) index of 
regulatory capture and the Transparency International regional corruption index, as well as two control 
variables for regional conditions taken from the Yearbook of Russian regions: an index of natural resource 
dependence, constructed as the share of extractive industries in Gross Regional Industrial Production, and 
the share of small enterprises per capita. 
 
The regional detail of the institutional indicators is reported in Appendix D. The variable for regional 
regulatory capture was constructed by Slinko et al. (2005) for 73 Russian regions and is computed by 
considering regional laws enacted in the period 1995-2000 and found to contain preferential treatment for 
the five largest non-state firms and the larger State-owned enterprises on a regional basis. The second 
institutional variable considers regional corruption of law enforcement, and is constructed on the basis of a 
survey by Transparency International as an index reflecting entrepreneurs’ perception of corruption in the 
judicial process.17 Given the structure of the Russian judicial system, the evaluation is likely to refer to 
arbitration courts, the commercial courts that more directly affect the operation of enterprises. The survey 
was conducted in 2002. Nonetheless, since a similar variable for previous years is not available, the 
assessment on corruption of the judiciary is used as a proxy for the previous period average. Although, 
strictly speaking, this procedure is incorrect, it is realistic to assume that institutional variables are stable in 
the short run, and, therefore, posterior values can sensibly be used as proxies for previous years.  
 
 
4. Empirical methodology and results 
 
My empirical strategy consists in estimating two aspects of export behaviour: the decision to export and the 
share of exports to developed markets. Analysis will proceed in two steps. The first step will examine the 
role of firm characteristics, specific exporting experience and agglomeration effects.18 The second step will 
focus on institutional factors and other regional conditions. Since institutional conditions, as well as other 
regional characteristics, are long-run phenomena that are best considered as period averages, analysis will be 
conducted in a static framework, taking 2001 as a reference year. 
 
 
4.1 Firm characteristics, experience and agglomeration effects 
 
 
4.1.1 The export decision 
 
The export decision is modelled by replicating the approach of Bernard and Jensen (2001 and 2004). As 
shown in Appendix C, the firm’s decision to export in period t is defined as the production of a non-negative 
export quantity q*it and is determined according to the following decision rule: 
 
1=itY  if 0~ ≥itπ  
 (1) 
0=itY  if 0~ <itπ  
 
where πit are profits from exporting and are defined as follows: 
                                                 
17
 This variable was kindly provided by Evgeniy Yakovlev of CEFIR, Moscow. 
18
 The period of analysis is 1996-2001 in the case of the export decision and 1998-2001, due to data availability, in the case of the 
share of exports to developed markets. 
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( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ]001~ *1*11* =⋅−>⋅+−−⋅−⋅= ++− itittitittititittit qWEqWEYcqp δδσπ     (2) 
 
In other words, a firm will decide to export if the sum of present and expected future profits from exporting 
is non-negative. Profits in export markets depend on export revenues - with pt being the exogenous 
international price for the firm’s product and q*it the profit-maximizing export quantity – minus the cost 
connected with exporting. The latter is composed of the firm’s variable cost of production and of the one-off 
sunk cost of entry into export markets. The variable cost of production, cit - as detailed in Appendix C - is 
determined by elements that may vary across firms and over time, by time dependent variables, at well as by 
time invariant features of the environment. Sunk costs, σ, are assumed to be present if the firm did not 
export in the previous period. Given that the international export price is exogenous, profit will ultimately 
depend on the variable cost of production and on the sunk cost of entry. 
 
In order to identify the factors that determine the probability of exporting, I will follow Bernard and Jensen 
(2004) in adopting a linear probability framework to estimate a binary non-structural model. This approach 
is chosen because of its computational simplicity and its versatility in allowing, as discussed below, the 
employment of GMM techniques that address the issue of estimation of the coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable. The following model is estimated: 
 
1=itY   if   ( ) 01 11 >+−−+++ −− εστδγβ itittiitit YTAZX  
 (3) 
0=itY     otherwise 
 
The explained variable for export status, Yit, is binary, taking a value of one if the firm exports in the 
reference period. The determinants of the variable cost of production, cit, are included in Xit-1 and Zit. The 
vector Xit-1 incorporates firm-specific characteristics, such as size, productivity, capital intensity, wage 
levels, foreign ownership, as well as the lagged share of exports in firm turnover, embodying past exporting 
experience. Zit includes spillovers from the activity of neighbouring exporters. Time invariant 
characteristics, such as firm origin, as well as regional and industry fixed effects are included in Ai. The last 
the term, σ(1-Yit-1), reflects the role of sunk costs of entry into export markets. 
 
Firm characteristics in the vector Xit-1 have been found in studies of several other countries to be different 
for exporters and non exporters, with the former generally appearing to be larger, more productive and 
paying higher wages.19 These features are included as lagged logarithms. Firm size is embodied in the 
number of employees; labour productivity is calculated as sales per worker; capital intensity is represented 
by fixed capital per worker; while wage levels are computed as the total wage bill divided by the number of 
employees. A dummy for foreign ownership takes into account the possibility that a foreign investor may 
have acquired a share in the capital of the firm for re-exporting purposes.20 Finally, specific exporting 
experience in the form of export intensity is constructed as the lagged share of exports in turnover. This 
reflects exporting know-how in the sense that familiarity with international markets depends not only on 
exporting status per se but, crucially, on export volumes. 
 
The vector Zit includes variables representing the possibility of spillovers deriving from the agglomeration 
of exporting activity. Replicating the classification of the possible sources of spillovers employed by 
Bernard and Jensen (2004), regional-industrial export propensity and intensity are considered in turn. 
Alternative measures of proximity to neighbouring exporters are also considered. They reflect the propensity 
or intensity of exporting of the firm’s sector outside the firm’s region, and in the firm’s region excluding the 
firm’s sector. 
 
                                                 
19
 See, for example, Bernard and Jensen (1999, 1999a, 2001 and 2004) for the United States, Bernard and Wagner (1997 and 2001) 
for Germany, Girma et al. (2003) for the United Kingdom, Greenaway et al. (2003) for Sweden, Clerides et al. (1998) for Colombia, 
Mexico and Morocco. 
20
 Inclusion of the foreign ownership dummy will shorten the time period of estimation (1997-2000) relative to the data on exporting 
activity (1996-2001). Kozlov and Manaenkov (2002) and Yudaeva et al. (2003) examine the effects of foreign ownership in the 
Russian context.  
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The vector Ai stands for a number of exogenous firm-specific characteristics that are stable in the short run, 
such as the firm’s region and sector of operation. Dummies for the region where a firm operates control for 
the geographic, economic and political conditions of a particular region. Industry dummies are intended to 
reflect the comparative advantage that is associated with particular industries. 21 The vector Ai also includes 
a binary variable that identifies the firm as new22 or old, as a direct control for the legacies of central 
planning, in the sense that new firms are less likely to have inherited commercial ties with the CIS and may 
therefore be less prone to export when considering the export decision as such, that is not distinguishing 
according to export destination. The vector Tt includes year dummies, as a proxy for exogenous time-
dependent market-level variables, such as global shocks that affect all regions indiscriminately, short run 
fluctuations in the exchange rate, and demand conditions for the firm’s product.  
 
The term σ(1-Yit-1) reflects the one-off sunk cost of entry into export markets and is obtained by including a 
dummy for lagged export status. As in Dixit (1989), sunk costs represent the direct monetary expenses 
incurred at the time of entry in a new market and may be ascribed to the establishment of a distribution 
network or to marketing and advertising costs. The joint significance of lagged export status and lagged 
export intensity –the other variable reflecting export experience included in Xit-1 - will be tested in each 
regression.  
 
The most intricate methodological question concerns the identification of the parameter on the lagged value 
of the dependent variable, namely lagged export status. The panel structure of the data would warrant the 
use of fixed or random effects techniques, which would allow obtaining insights from having observations 
repeated over time for the same unit. Both techniques have some shortcomings. A random effects 
specification would confront the difficulty of requiring unobserved effects not only to have a random 
structure but to be uncorrelated with explanatory variables included in the model. This assumption is hardly 
tenable in the context of exporting activity, since, as discussed in Bernard and Jensen (2004), included firm 
features are likely to be correlated with such unobserved variables as the production technology available in 
each particular firm or managerial ability23. Fixed effects estimation, on its part, also involves some 
drawbacks for our purposes. Notably, most fixed effects specifications produce biased and inconsistent 
estimates for coefficients on lagged dependent variables, which would hinder the estimation of sunk costs.24 
  
In order to overcome this problem, equation (3) will be estimated by employing a GMM approach. As in 
Bernard and Jensen (2004), one option is to consider the Arellano and Bond (1991) methodology with first 
differencing of variables, where lagged levels of the variables are valid instruments for the first differenced 
equation, provided that there is no second order serial correlation in the residuals. Another option is 
provided by the Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM method, which combines a set of equations in first-
differences, instrumented with lagged levels, and a set of equation in levels, instrumented with lagged 
differences.  Given the relatively short time dimension of the data (1996-2001), difference GMM will imply 
the loss of many observations, but it is nonetheless useful to examine its results in order to directly address 
the issue of sunk costs. System GMM, on the other hand, addresses another drawback of the model in first 
differences, allowing to estimate time invariant characteristics, such as the status of new firm. Furthermore, 
first differencing leads to poor estimates if the series are highly persistent, thus providing an additional 
reason to prefer system GMM. 
 
The GMM specifications will be compared to a simple pooled OLS estimation that ignores firm specific 
effects, and to a fixed effects formulation. As discussed in Bond (2002), OLS estimation, given its upward 
bias, will provide an upper bound for the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, while fixed effects, 
which is downward biased, will provide a lower bound. A heuristic criterion to judge the validity of the 
GMM estimates will thus be provided by considering whether the estimated coefficient lies between the two 
extremes. 
                                                 
21
 Chapter 2 on Industrial Competitiveness in OECD (2004) contains a detailed breakdown of the revealed comparative advantage 
computed for various industrial sectors. 
22
 See Appendix B for an account of the methodology used to define a firm as “new”. This variable will be dropped from estimation 
in some specifications.  
23
 Hausman tests soundly reject a random effects specification, pointing to correlation between unobserved firm effects and other 
explanatory variables. 
24
 See Bernard and Jensen (2004) and references therein for a discussion of the drawbacks of different estimation methods in the 
context of exporting.  
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Results 
 
As previously discussed, specific exporting experience, in the form of sunk costs of entry and past export 
volumes, may lead to persistence in exporting activity, especially in the context of Russia, where significant 
presence in the CIS may have been inherited from Soviet times. Firm Characteristics were hypothesized to 
influence the export decision, with larger and more productive firms being more inclined to be present in 
international markets. The dispersed distribution of industry inherited from Soviet central planning, on its 
part, was assumed to be a relevant influence on export performance by highlighting the spillover effects of 
agglomeration, with viable firms, including exporters, more likely to survive in locations and industries 
which were less artificially located to begin with. 
 
Table 6 reports the results of the effects of experience, firm characteristics and agglomeration effects, with 
panel A showing spillovers form export propensity and panel B showing spillovers from export intensity of 
neighbouring firms. Columns (1) to (4) of Tables 6A and 6B present the results of different estimation 
methods: pooled OLS, fixed effects, GMM in first differences and system GMM. Columns (5) and (6) 
report results with the inclusion of a dummy for foreign ownership as an additional explanatory variable.25 
 
[Table 6A here] 
 
[Table 6B here] 
 
As previously discussed, pooled OLS and fixed effects yield inconsistent estimates of lagged export status, 
with the former producing an upward biased estimate and the latter generating a downward biased estimate 
of the coefficient value. On the other hand, consistent estimates may be obtained from difference and system 
GMM. As expected, both specifications generate a parameter value lying between the two extremes of the 
OLS and the fixed effect models. It may be concluded that sunk costs of entry into export markets, as 
represented by lagged export status, have a significant impact on the probability of exporting, suggesting a 
fairly high persistence in exporting behaviour, with having exported in the previous period increasing the 
probability of exporting by over 20%. Past export shares, the supplementary measure of firm-specific 
experience, on the other hand, are not significant in the GMM specifications of columns (3) and (4). 
 
Regarding firm characteristics, when accounting for firms’ unobserved heterogeneity in the consistent GMM 
specifications, only firm size is always significant. This result contrasts with the findings of studies for other 
countries. It may provide a first indication that, in the case of Russia, inherited commercial ties, as 
represented by the significance of lagged export status, are more important than firm-level features in 
determining international orientation. Even the relevance of the parameter on size is more readily interpreted 
as continuing lack of restructuring in exporting manufacturers, than as an ex post gauge of a firm’s success. 
That the coefficient on the condition of new firm is insignificant in the consistent system GMM 
specification indicates that traditional firms, who are more likely to be present in CIS markets, are the most 
probable exporters. 
  
Spillovers form export intensity of neighbouring exporters (Table 6B) are only significant in the difference 
GMM specification. On the other hand, the large marginal effect in all specification of regional-industrial 
spillovers from export propensity (Table 6A) suggests that agglomeration effects may indeed be important 
in determining the export status of firms located in regional-industrial clusters, albeit, in the system GMM 
specification, the result is only significant at the 10% level. These outcomes seem to contrast with the 
findings of Bernard and Jensen (2004) for the United States, of Aitken et al (1997) for Mexico, and of 
Clerides et al. (1998) for Colombia and Morocco, who find no evidence of spillovers from neighbouring 
exporters. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25
 Data on foreign ownership cover the period 1997-2000. Given the short time span it was not possible to estimate this model with a 
GMM methodology. Pooled OLS and fixed effects results are presented for comparison. 
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4.1.2 Export to developed countries 
 
Supplementary insights may be provided by consideration of the determinants of the destination of Russian 
exports. Indeed, taking into account the share of exports to developed countries, instead of the export 
decision per se, may produce results that are more in line with the evidence for other countries, that is the 
self-selection of better firms into export markets may become apparent. This is due to the fact that the 
determinants of exporting may be different for exports to developed countries and the CIS, since markets in 
developed countries can be expected to be more challenging in terms of higher quality and cost 
competitiveness of products. These characteristics are likely to be associated with more efficient firms, as 
well as with an incentive structure, both within the firm and in its environment, which rewards innovation 
and efficiency.  
 
The equation for the share of export to developed countries is 
 
( ) εστδγβ itittiititDit YTAZXY +−−+++= −− 11 1         (4) 
 
The dependent variable, YDit, represents the share of exports to developed markets by value in firm total 
exports. The vector Xit-1 includes firm-specific characteristics, such as size, productivity, capital intensity, 
wage levels and foreign ownership, as well as lagged export shares to developed countries, representing 
specific experience in these markets. Zit includes spillovers from the activity of neighbouring exporters. Ai 
includes time invariant characteristics such as regional and industry fixed effects and firm origin, which may 
now be relevant since new exporting firms may have a larger share of exports to developed markets. Finally, 
the term σ(1-Yit-1) reflects one off sunk costs of entry into export markets, with Yit-1 being a vector of 
dummies with a value of one if the firm was an exporter in the previous period. 
 
In order to control for the sample selection bias that may be connected with exports to developed countries, 
estimation will be based on Heckman’s (1979) two-step procedure. This takes into account the double 
selection mechanism underlying the orientation of exports to different destinations: a decision is made 
whether to enter the export market, and, only if this hurdle is passed, the share of exports to developed 
countries may be observed. Such an approach avoids the estimation bias that would result from the fact that 
the self-selected sample of exporters to developed countries is not representative of the population of 
exporters. 
  
Given the short time period (1998-2001) for the data on exports to developed countries, it will not be 
possible to apply the GMM methodology in this context. Thus, interpretation of the coefficient on the lagged 
share of exports to developed countries will have to rely on the heuristic consideration of it being an upward 
bound, since, both in the pooled OLS and in the pooled Heckman (1979) specification, estimation will rely 
on an OLS model. 
 
 
Results 
 
Table 7 reports the results of the effects of experience, firm characteristics and agglomeration effects on the 
share of exports to developed markets, with panel A including spillovers form export propensity and panel B 
including spillovers from export intensity. Columns (1) to (3) present the results obtained from different 
estimation methods: pooled OLS in levels, fixed effects and a pooled Heckman selection model. Columns 
(4) to (6) report results from the same estimation methods with the inclusion of a dummy for foreign 
ownership as an additional explanatory variable. 
 
[Table 7A here] 
 
[Table 7B here] 
 
The coefficients on firm specific experience indicate that there is a high persistence of exporting to more 
developed markets. This is especially true for lagged export share, which would confirm that firms face 
important initial barriers to entry into more advanced markets.  
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Among firm level characteristics, not only firm size but, in contrast with the export decision per se, also 
labour productivity has an impact on the proportion of export to developed markets. The positive effect of 
labour productivity confirms the expectation that only more productive firms are able to compete in more 
advanced markets. This may also provide prima facie evidence of the emergence of more competitive 
players, notably in more demanding export markets, in a process of intra-industry reallocation of market 
shares, of the type proposed by Melitz (2003). The wage variable is insignificant in determining a higher 
share of exports to developed countries, implying that exporters to developed markets do not bear the burden 
of a wage premium over exporters in general and non-exporters. The capital intensity variable is also 
insignificant, suggesting that the capital stock employed is still largely obsolete across the board, even for 
firms that export to developed markets.  
 
That labour productivity and size are the only relevant firm level characteristics in determining export shares 
to developed markets, and that positive effects of wages and capital intensity fail to be detected, implies that 
the competitive advantage of Russian exporters to developed markets relies mainly on a cost structure that is 
managing to keep its wage component under control, notwithstanding the appreciation of the real exchange 
rate.26 The status of new firm presents a consistently positive association with exports to developed markets, 
as does the presence of foreign owners. This would indicate that new and foreign owned firms that are 
export oriented tend to have a larger proportion of their shipments directed to developed markets. 
 
Both regional-industrial export propensity and regional-industrial export intensity have a large effect on a 
firm’s ability to direct a larger share of its shipments to developed markets. Better exporters would indeed 
seem to be clustered in specific regions and industries. As mentioned, this result may be interpreted in light 
of the fact that Russian industry in general is still far less geographically concentrated than it would if its 
spatial distribution had been determined solely by market forces. Notwithstanding the generally low 
agglomeration of industry, clustering of the best exporters could well be an early reflection of the fact that 
market mechanisms are beginning to overcome the irrational location decision made by central planners. In 
particular, geographical concentration of exporters may make it feasible to access specialized transportation 
infrastructure or information on the preferences of foreign customers, thus facilitating penetration of foreign 
markets. 
 
 
4.2 Institutional quality and other regional conditions 
 
It can be hypothesized that the structural characteristics of the region in which firms are located enter 
directly in their cost function, since the variable cost of production, as detailed in Appendix C, is also 
determined by time invariant features of the environment. Institutional and other regional conditions may 
thus affect the expected profits, and hence the probability, of exporting, as well as the intensity of exports to 
more developed markets. 
  
Since regional conditions are best interpreted as long run phenomena, analysis of their influence on export 
status and orientation is carried out taking 2001 as the reference year and using the averages of past years for 
all explanatory variables. 
 
Adapting equation (3) to a one-period framework, and extending it to include institutional and other regional 
variables, the export decision in 2001 will be determined according to the following binary choice model 
 
1=iY    if   ( ) 01 2000 >+−−+++ εσλδγβ iiiTiTiiT YEINX  
 (5) 
0=iY     otherwise 
 
                                                 
26
 This might signify that the factor market as such has not yet emerged as channel for the weeding out of less productive firms, as 
implied by Melitz (2003), with the increased demand for labour caused by the expansion of more productive firms, exporters to 
developed markets in this case, forcing less efficient firms to exit. 
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The share of exports to developed countries in 2001, with the addition of regional conditions, is modified as 
follows, relative to equation (4): 
 
( ) εσλδγβ iiiTiTiiTDi YEINXY +−−+++= 20001         (6) 
 
In equations (5) and (6) XiT includes averages for the previous period of firm level characteristics, such as 
size, labour productivity, capital intensity, average wage and past export intensity, which is constructed as 
1996-2000 average exports in turnover in the case of (5) and 1998-2001 average share of exports to 
developed countries in total exports in (6). Ni is a dummy that takes a value of one if the firm belongs to the 
new private sector and zero otherwise. The term σ(1-Yi2000) represents the one-off costs of entry into export 
markets and is a dummy with a value of one if the firm exported in the previous period. IiT is a vector of 
institutional variables, while EiT controls for other regional conditions.  
 
The vector IiT is intended to reflect how propitious the institutional climate is for economic activity and, in 
particular, for the promotion of efficient exporters. It includes the Slinko et al. (2005) regional index of 
regulatory capture for the period 1995-2000 and the Transparency International index of corruption of the 
judiciary.  
 
The vector EiT contains controls for other, non-institutional, regional conditions. The first control is 
constructed as the 1995-2000 average incidence of extractive industries – oil, gas and mining – in gross 
regional industrial production (GRIP). The second control for regional conditions reflects the degree of 
business development and is constructed as the 1995-2000 average ratio of small enterprises over regional 
population. 
 
Table 8 indicates that the effects of experience and firm characteristics are broadly in line with those 
previously obtained: experience plays an important role for both export status and destination, and firms 
with larger shares of exports to developed markets are more productive. 
 
[Table 8 here] 
 
Turning to institutional variables, a firm’s export decision per se is only affected by corruption of the 
judiciary with a significance level of 10%, while the degree of regulatory capture has no effect. This implies 
that the subversion of regional institutions does not have a great impact on exporting when considering 
export status as such, that is not distinguishing between exports to the CIS and exports to more developed 
countries. It was argued that exporting to the CIS is less challenging for Russian firms, given their 
familiarity with local demand conditions and the possible presence of commercial ties inherited from the 
past. This suggest that cost effectiveness, insofar as it is affected by unfriendly regional institutions, is not 
the most crucial factor for competing in CIS markets. 
 
The results concerning export orientation present a markedly different picture. Both corruption of the 
judicial process and regulatory capture have a significant impact on the share of exports to developed 
countries, even when accounting for regional and industrial fixed effects in the selection model presented in 
column (3). World Bank (2000) argues that the most successful firms, especially from the new private 
sector, have an active role in capturing state institutions, since attempting to influence the content of laws, 
regulations and judicial decisions is a rational survival strategy in high capture environments. The expenses 
connected with such lobbying activity enter directly in the cost function of firms and directly affect the 
profitability of exporting. Thus, the significantly negative effects of regulatory capture and judicial 
corruption on the intensity of exports to developed markets confirm that the costs of operating in a high 
capture environment are a relevant burden on the international competitiveness of the best firms.  
 
Among other regional economic conditions, high resource dependence displays the expected negative sign 
only for the decision to export per se. Nonetheless, the economic magnitude of this effect on the probability 
of export participation is virtually nil and is statistically significant only at the 10% level. The share of 
exports to developed countries, on the other hand, is totally unaffected by a large regional incidence of 
extractive industries. This indicates that regional resource dependence does not hamper the emergence of 
export oriented manufacturers.  
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Small business development is also insignificant, indicating that no conclusions may be drawn as to whether 
a large presence of small businesses is of the vicious kind implied by the Dutch disease story of an 
abnormally large non-traded sector, or of the virtuous variety implied by the existence of a network of 
subcontractors for exporters. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Much of the policy debate in recent years has hinged upon the vital need for the Russian economy, 
particularly its export structure, to diversify away from natural resource dependence. An upshot of 
diversification should be the creation of a thriving manufacturing sector, able to compete in international 
markets. This paper tried to disentangle the factors that influence manufacturing exporting, assessing the 
relevance of firm level variables, spillover effects and structural features of the environment, for both the 
decision to export and orientation towards developed markets. 
 
Enterprise-level analysis suggests that specific exporting experience is the main factor influencing 
international orientation, while firm-level characteristics - with the exception of firm size, and labour 
productivity in the case of export to developed markets - are less relevant. At the same time, the Soviet 
legacy in terms of dispersed location of industry still seems relevant for firm performance, since, contrary to 
the evidence for other countries, manufacturers who are competitive in developed markets have emerged in 
regional-industrial clusters. 
 
Institutional pathologies, notably the subversion of law making and enforcement in courts, are important 
obstacles to the emergence of internationally competitive firms: while their effects seem inconsequential for 
the export decision itself, their relevance for the destination of Russian manufacturing shipments is 
substantial. Dependence of the Russian economy on natural resources, on the other hand, has a negligible 
impact on the emergence manufacturing exporters, implying that resource-driven growth is not incompatible 
with a competitive manufacturing sector. Combining this result with the negative impact of regulatory 
capture and a corrupt judiciary, it may be argued that resource dependence is harmful only insofar as it 
contributes to degenerate the quality of existing institutions. It may even be conjectured that the increased 
effective exposure to trade, which goes with the exchange rate appreciation related to resource dependence, 
may be a driving force in the shaping of a fit and competitive manufacturing sector, with an emerging 
distribution of firms along a spectrum going from the most productive, those with larger exports to 
developed countries, through those who export predominantly to the CIS, to non-exporters.  
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Appendix A: Data sources 
 
 
Regional level datasets 
 
Goskomstat Yearbook of Russian Regions (1970-2001) 
It contains many economic and social regional indicators. In the present study use is made of the yearbook 
for the construction of region-specific variables, such as SME per capita and incidence of extractive 
industries in Gross Regional Industrial Production. 
 
Transparency International: Regional Corruption Indices (2002) 
The survey was conducted by Transparency International. The corruption indices have been built on the 
basis of a sociological survey embracing 5666 individuals and 1838 entrepreneurs representing small and 
medium sized businesses in 40 Russia’s regions. The authors aimed to present a three-dimensional picture of 
corruption in Russia, embracing both everyday and business corruption, both estimation characteristics and 
the indicators characterizing corruption practices, as well as present indicators generalizing different 
dimensions of corruption and allowing to compare overall situation across regions. The survey was used for 
the variable describing entrepreneurs’ perception of corruption in the judicial process. The survey results 
were kindly provided by Evgeniy Yakovlev. 
 
Index of Regulatory Capture (1995-2000) 
This index is constructed by Slinko et al. (2005) for 73 Russian regions. It is computed by considering 
regional laws containing preferential treatment for the five largest non-state firms and the larger SOEs on a 
regional basis. The index is directly used in the analysis and was kindly provided by Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. 
 
 
Firm level datasets 
 
RERLD (1995-2001) 
The Russian Enterprise Registry Longitudinal Database (RERLD) is an annual enterprise census conducted 
by Goskomstat, the Russian statistical agency. It contains, among other variables, balance sheet information 
on, sales, total cost, number of employees, wages, book value of capital, subsidies and 2, 3 and 5 digit 
industry codes. It includes all Russian industrial firms with over one hundred employees, all state-owned 
enterprises, and non-state firms with fewer than one hundred employees that are up to 75% individually 
owned. For a detailed description of the RERLD see Brown and Brown (1999). The census is utilized for the 
construction of firm-specific variables and their deviations from sectoral means: employment, output per 
worker, capital intensity, average wage. The output and capital five-digit industry deflators were 
incorporated in the database and kindly provided by Evguenia Bessonova. 
  
Customs Export Database (1996-2001) 
It contains all transactions, specifying commodity, value, firm and, starting in 1998, country of destination. 
It can be matched with the RERLD by way of a unique firm identifier. It was employed to identify exporting 
firms and the total value of their export in each year. This database was kindly provided by Konstantin 
Kozlov who also provided irreplaceable assistance for its cleaning and matching with the main database. 
 
RFOF (1997-2000) 
The Registry of Foreign Owned Firms (RFOF) is an annual enterprise census, which includes all fully or 
partially foreign owned firms operating in the Russian Federation. It contains, among other variables, 
detailed information on foreign ownership, such as shareholding and country of the investor. It can be partly 
matched with the RERLD by employing unique firm identifiers. The RFOF was used to construct and match 
the dummy variable for foreign ownership. For a detailed description of the RFOF see Yudaeva et al. 
(2003).  
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Appendix B: Definition of “new” firms 
 
A cut-off point to define an enterprise as new may be identified in 1991, the year in which the Soviet Union 
officially ceased to exist. The table below shows the average size of new entrants in the census in 1992, 
1993 and 1994 to be at odds with the fact that they are new firms, since these are likely to be small at the 
outset. This might mean that most new entrants are not new firms but simply old Soviet concerns that, for 
some reason, are being reclassified with a new identifier. A smaller average size of new entries can thus 
offer a guiding principle to spot a more appropriate cut-off point. A sharp drop in the average employment 
of new admissions to the database can be observed in 1995. This might suggest 1994 as a more suitable 
discontinuity, coinciding with the year in which the first wave of voucher privatisation was implemented. 
Rather than by the inclusion of new firms, the sharp drop in average size could, admittedly, be generated by 
the restructuring that may have occurred after the formal transfer of ownership into private hands. Another 
possible explanation could be the inclusion of spin-offs of traditional enterprises. Nonetheless, even 
accounting for the evident built in defects in the data, 1994 appears as a more appropriate cut-off point to 
obtain an approximate impression of the behaviour of new private firms. 
 
1985 132636 36.11 505
1986 245 0.07 395
1987 266 0.07 625
1988 91 0.02 241
1989 91 0.02 469
1990 728 0.20 1133
1991 19453 5.30 513
1992 30590 8.33 1280
1993 24178 6.58 595
1994 22589 6.15 320
1995 35651 9.71 150
1996 14098 3.84 169
1997 24969 6.80 180
1998 16898 4.60 195
1999 17486 4.76 217
2000 15918 4.33 204
2001 11382 3.10 152
PercentYear of inclusion Number of firms
Average 
employment of new 
entrants
Table B1: The size of firms by year of inclusion in the census
 
 
Overall, given the scarce incentives that authentically new firms may have to report to Goskomstat, our 
definition of “new” firms is best interpreted with caution, and as including, for the most part, traditional 
firms, or at least their human and physical assets, that underwent transformation in the aftermath of voucher 
privatisation. Nonetheless, in a less conventional sense, these firms may be considered as non-traditional, in 
that they are more likely to have experienced a profound transformation of sorts, involving, perhaps, 
restructuring of industrial operations and a novel stance towards market conditions.  
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Appendix C: A model of the export decision 
 
Building upon the approach of Bernard and Jensen (2001), the decision to export can be modelled as 
follows. Let 
 ( ) ( )** ,,,, ittitititttitit qAZXcqpAZX ii −⋅=π         (C1) 
 
be the profits derived from exporting activity that a firm receives in any period t. Profits in export markets 
are given by export revenues - with pt being the exogenous international price for the firm’s product and q*it 
the profit-maximizing export quantity – minus the firm’s variable cost of production. This cost depends on a 
number of features both internal and external to the firm. Xit incorporates firm-specific characteristics, such 
as size, productivity, capital intensity, ownership structure, and spillovers from the activity of neighbouring 
exporters. Zt represents a set of exogenous time-dependent market-level variables, such as exchange rates 
and demand conditions for the firm’s product. Ai stands for a number of exogenous firm-specific 
characteristics that are stable in the short run, such as the firm’s sector of operation and structural features of 
the economic and institutional environment. 
 
The export decision of the firm in any given period will depend on whether export profits for the period, as 
well as the discounted expected stream of future profits, are non-negative. The export status of firm i in 
period t, Yit, will be determined as follows: 
 
1=itY  if ( ) 0,, ≥ititit AZXπ  
(C2) 
0=itY  if ( ) 0,, <itit AZXitπ  
 
The single period profit equation (C1) can be extended to a multi-period framework. The firm’s expected 
profits become 
 
( ) ( )[ ]



−⋅=Π ∑∞
=
−
ts
isisisisiss
ts
ttitit qAZXcqpEAZX it ** ,,,, δ       (C3) 
 
If the learning-by-exporting hypothesis holds, it is possible to assume that costs in the current period are 
positively influenced by the firm’s past exporting experience, for instance, if the firm becomes more 
efficient at making its exported good by virtue of the know-how acquired in the past. Specifically, it can be 
assumed that 
 
( )** 1,,, itititititit qqAZXcc −=    with    ( )( ) 0* 1 <∂ ⋅∂ −ititqc   (C4) 
 
Thus, allowing for an influence of past experience on exporting behaviour, the single period profit function 
becomes: 
 
( ) ( )** 1** 1 ,,,,,,ˆ itititititittitititit qqAZXcqpqAZX −− −⋅=π        (C5) 
 
while the value function in a dynamic framework is given by: 
 
 ( ) ( )[ ]{ }*1ˆmax
*
itittititqit
qVEYV
it
⋅+⋅=⋅ +δπ         (C6) 
 
Accordingly, the firm’s export decision in period t would be based on an assessment of present and expected 
future profit streams. Therefore, Yit=1 if 
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( )[ ] ( )[ ]00ˆ *1*1 =⋅>>⋅+ ++ itittitittit qVEqVE δδπ         (C7) 
 
A further complication is now contemplated in the model. When a firm enters export markets it is likely to 
incur sunk costs, associated, for example, with the acquisition of information regarding foreign market 
conditions or with the establishment of a distribution network. As in Dixit (1989) these costs represent the 
direct monetary cost of entering a new market. Sunk costs, σ, are assumed to be present in the current period 
if the firm did not export in the previous period, that is if Yit-1=0.27 The single period profit function with 
sunk cost of entry will be: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1** 1** 1 1,,,,,,~ −−− −−−⋅= ititititititittitititit YqqAZXcqpqAZX σπ     (C8) 
 
with  
 
0>σ  if 0* 1=−itq . 
 
The modified value function, comprising both past experience and the eventuality of sunk costs, in a multi-
period framework is given by: 
 
( ) ( )[ ]{ }*1~max
*
itittititqit
qWEYW
it
⋅+⋅=⋅ +δπ         (C9) 
 
As before, the firm will decide to export if  
 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]00~ *1*1 =⋅>>⋅+ ++ itittitittit qWEqWE δδπ        (C10) 
 
Returning to binary formulation, the firm’s decision to export in period t – production of a non-negative q*it 
- will be determined according to the following decision rule: 
 
1=itY  if ( ) 0,,,~ * 1 ≥−itititit qAZXπ  
(C11) 
0=itY  if ( ) 0,,,~ * 1 <−itititit qAZXπ  
 
where 
 ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ]001,,,~ *1*11** 1* =⋅−>⋅+−−−⋅= ++−− itittitittititititititittit qWEqWEYqqAZXcqp δδσπ  (C12) 
 
is the latent variable underlying the decision to export. The decision rule can also be formulated as follows. 
Firm i will decide to enter the export market in period t if 
 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]{ } ( ) ( )1** 1*1*1* 1,,,00 −−++ −+>=⋅−>⋅+⋅ itititititititittitittitt YqqAZXcqWEqWEqp σδ  (C13) 
 
In other terms, the firm will decide to enter the export market in the current period if this period’s export 
revenues, augmented by a comparison of the discounted future values of entering versus not entering today, 
exceeds the variable cost of production plus the sunk costs of entry. 
                                                 
27
 Roberts and Tybout (1997) generalize the modelling of sunk costs by allowing them to depend on the length of absence from the 
market. 
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Appendix D: Indicators of institutional quality 
 
Region
Chelyabinsk oblast 0.416 0.554
Komi republic 0.403
Udmurtia Republic 0.258 0.600
Tatarstan republic 0.213 0.629
Kurgan oblast 0.189 0.555
Magadan oblast 0.189
Murmansk oblast 0.189
Orenburg oblast 0.178
Kursk oblast 0.163
Tomsk oblast 0.140 0.669
Kabardino-Balkar republic 0.137
Omsk oblast 0.135 0.587
Vologda oblast 0.134
Vladimir oblast 0.122
Bryansk oblast 0.093
Kirov oblast 0.079
Moscow city 0.073 0.637
Tyumen oblast 0.069 0.564
Stavropol krai 0.064 0.608
Sakha (Yakutia) republic 0.058
Altai republic 0.053
Krasnodar krai 0.053 0.677
Mordovia republic 0.042
Tula oblast 0.042 0.630
Moscow oblast 0.039 0.620
Penza oblast 0.037
Amur oblast 0.036 0.585
Khakasia republic 0.024
Krasnoyarsk krai 0.024 0.595
Mari-El republic 0.024
Volgograd oblast 0.016 0.623
Rostov oblast 0.012 0.622
Dagestan republic 0.010
Kostroma oblast 0.002
Perm oblast 0.001 0.629
Bashkortostan republic 0.000 0.564
Kemerovo oblast -0.002 0.611
Lipetsk oblast -0.002
Tver oblast -0.002 0.658
Adygeya republic -0.003
Sverdlovsk oblast -0.005 0.611
Nizhny Novgorod oblast -0.006 0.546
Kaliningrad oblast -0.013
Saratov oblast -0.015 0.589
Altai krai -0.026 0.606
Chita oblast -0.026
Karelia republic -0.032 0.575
Samara oblast -0.046 0.580
Evrei autonomous oblast -0.071
Novgorod oblast -0.071
Primorskii krai -0.071 0.573
Pskov oblast -0.071 0.501
Belgorod oblast -0.087 0.567
Voronezh oblast -0.088 0.601
Khabarovsk krai -0.097 0.663
Smolensk oblast -0.098
Astrakhan oblast -0.101
Yaroslavl oblast -0.114 0.519
Sakhalin oblast -0.120
Ivanovo oblast -0.125
Ulyanovsk oblast -0.126 0.502
Tambov oblast -0.137 0.559
Kaluga oblast -0.141
Novosibirsk oblast -0.150 0.614
Oryol oblast -0.154
Karachaevo-Cherkess republic -0.167
Ryazan oblast -0.167 0.613
Chuvash republic -0.195
St. Petersburg city -0.195 0.592
Kamchatka oblast -0.236
Arkhangelsk oblast -0.306 0.486
Irkutsk oblast -0.306
Leningrad oblast 0.651
Index of Regulatory Capture (Slinko 
et al., 2005)
Entrepreneurs’ perception of Judicial 
Corruption (Transparency 
International)
 
